Critique of Archaeological Reason
3. Notes

Notes to Chapter 14. The relevance of structure

– May 2023

14.1 Structure
14.2 The Kantian model
      14.2.1 The nature of the impact
      14.2.2 The organization of my argument
14.3 Tensionality – the Kantian intuition
      14.3.1 Introductory
      14.3.2 The notion of bracing
      14.3.3 "Transcendental"
      14.3.4 "Critique" and grammar
14.4 Tensionality – the implications
      14.4.1 Open and closed structures
      14.4.2 The overlay of structural systems
      14.4.3 Binary oppositions
14.5 Inclusivity – the Kantian intuition
      14.5.1 Introductory
      14.5.2 "Analytics"
      14.5.3 Totality: "unity" and "synthesis" as structure
      14.5.4 The constitutive elements: "subdivison" and "dissection"
14.6 Inclusivity – the implications
      14.6.1 Univocal relationship among structural elements
      14.6.2 Scalarity
      14.6.3 Rules
      14.6.4 Distributional analysis
      14.6.5 Grammatical and inferential structures
14.7 Referentiality – the Kantian intuition
      14.7.1 Introductory
      14.7.2 Referential levels
      14.7.3 A homeostatic system and the external referent
      14.7.4 "Metaphysics"
      14.7.5 The substantive nature of the referential dimension
      14.7.6 "Reason"
      14.7.7 "Dialectics"
14.8 Referentiality – the implications
      14.8.1 The external referent
      14.8.2 Interlocking systems
      14.8.3 A world encased
      14.8.4 Semiotics
14.9 A systemic cohesiveness
14.10 The Kantian legacy
      14.10.1 Three stages
      14.10.2 The ultimate impact
14.11 Para-perception and the transcendental revolution
14.12 A critique of "human" reason

14.1 Structure

Wynn 1989 Evolution.
Hegmon & Kulow 2005 Painting for the relationship between structure and agency, where agency is seen as defining (dynamically) ceramic style understood as structure.
For a structural contribution in archaeology, see e.g. Caws 1997 Structuralism.
– [ Laerke Recht, July 2016]

14.2.1 The nature of the impact

Kant’s three Critiques: Kant 1781 Reinen Vernunft, Kant 1788 Praktischen Vernunft, Kant 1790 Kritik.
– [ Laerke Recht, July 2016]

14.3.1 Introductory

Transcendental in Kant: Pereboom 2014 Transcendental Arguments.
– [ Laerke Recht, August 2016]

14.3.2 The notion of bracing

For a connection with hermeneutics see Marassi 1998 Gadamer Ermeneutica.
Wynn 1989 Evolution.
Transcendental reflection, Kant 1787 Kritik, p. B350f.
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14.3.3 "Transcendental"

Transcendental deduction, Kant 1781 Reinen Vernunft, Ch. II.I.1.2.
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14.4.1 Open and closed structures

On Aristotle see Kant and also the bibliographical entry on Aristotle’s Divisions: Aristotle 2005 Divisioni.
Cf. Cassirer 2000 Substanzbegriff Und Funktionsbegriff.
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Kant on Aristotle, Kant 1787 Kritik, p. B107.
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14.4.2 The overlay of structural systems

Caws 1997 Structuralism, pp. 105-107 and 215-218, develops the notion of structural complexity in ways that are similar to the point made here. He also expands on the notion of formalism in relationship to complexity.

14.4.3 Binary oppositions

Panneerselvam 1999 Structural Hermeneutics.
Levi- Strauss 1955 Structural Study Of Myth.
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14.5.1 Introductory

Dilthey: see Rodi 2003 Strukturierte.
Cassirer: see Mezzanzanica 2006 Dilthey, pp. 214-216.
Lévi-Strauss: Levi- Strauss 1955 Structural Study Of Myth.
Analytics and dialectics: Grier 2012 Metaphysics.
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14.5.2 "Analytics"

“Es war ein eines scharfsinnigen Mannes würdiger Anschlag des Aristoteles, diese Grundbegriffe aufzusuchen. Da er aber kein Prinzipium hatte, so raffte er sie auf, wie sie ihm aufstießen, und trieb deren zuerst zehn auf, die er Kategorien (Prädikamente) nannte.” (KrV, p. B107).
Kant’s best definition of a system is in Anfangsgründe, p. 467.
Cassirer 1921 Einsteinschen.

14.5.3 Totality: "unity" and "synthesis" as structure

Kant on Aristotle, Kant 1787 Kritik, p. B107.
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Kant defining system, Kant 1786 Metaphysische, p. 467.
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14.5.4 The constitutive elements: "subdivison" and "dissection"

For a ‘systematic art of dissection” by which the “manifold” may be split through a mental subdivision see Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, p. 471.
For the “unity of the subdivision in genders and species” see Kritik der Urteilskraft, p. XL.
For the notion of binary opposition see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. B110.
For the “genealogical tree of the pure intellect” see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. B108.
For Kant’s referring to his first Critique as a ” critical attempt”, see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. B107.
Kant defining system, Kant 1786 Metaphysische, p. 467.
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14.6.3 Rules

Chomsky 1980 Rules; see also Caws 1997 Structuralism, p. 106 with reference to Chomsky interview.
An interesting example is that of graphemic rules: a grapheme is not understandable as a static entity by itself, but in terms of its regulated relationship to other graphemes.

14.6.4 Distributional analysis

With regard to the example of distributional analysis drawn from ethnicity, see Buccellati G 2010 Ethnicity for a fuller treatment of the theroretical basis, and Buccellati G 2013 Hurrian for a set of data from the Urkesh cluster. For an application of the tree representation to glyptic typological categorization see Kelly Buccellati 1977 Quantitative Analysis, Fig. A: Binary system for categorization of attributes in Old Babylonian Seals.
Gumermanand & Phillips 1978 Archaeology Beyond Anthropology and Bogucki 1985 Theoretical Directions: settlement pattern as an efficent tool of distributional analysis.
– [ Esmeralda Agolli, October 2014]

14.6.5 Grammatical and inferential structures

The important role of Cassirer, not generally recognized, is stressed by Caws 1997 Structuralism; see also Mezzanzanica 2006 Dilthey, pp. 214-16

14.7.2 Referential levels

The notion of an “opaque context” is helpful in defining the relationship between a given element and its referent. In the sense applied to Plato’s dialogs (Mc Donough 2013 Referential Opacity), the notion differs for its use in logic, and is used instead in an analogical sense. As such, it may similarly apply to the archaeological context, which we may illustrate with an example. We may consider it transparent that a discordant figurative attribute (say, horns on a human head) has a special significance. This is the first level of structural definition: the discordance is identified in terms of the representational canon of human figures. This canon is within the homeostatic system (14.7.3) of human representation, and as such it is transparent. “Opacity” comes in as one refers to referential levels beyond the primary system, going to other interlocking systems. And this is where inference (14.9) comes in. First level: the horns “signify” a divinity. Next referential level: the horns are a relic of prehistoric images (Cauvin 1994 Nascita Delle Divinità). Next referential level: the horns signifiy power. And so on.
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]

14.7.4 "Metaphysics"

The external referent, to the extent that it remains external, cannot be brought under the controlling “power of judgment,” cannot be “critiqued.” It can be neither affirmed nor denied – see KUk, p. 338.
It is instructive that Kant hardly ever uses the concept of ontology, and where he does it is essentially to declare it “empty, undetermined, useless,” (GM p. 91), arguing that that one can speak at best of “mere ontological predicates.” (KpV, p. 248 f.).
The concept of ontology never appears in the Pure Reason, whereas it occurs a few times in the Critique of Judgment, but only to refer (negatively, and somewhat condescendingly) to the opinion of “the ancients,” which are ultimately dismissed as mere ‘sophistry” – KUk, p. 470.
Kantian metaphysics: Grier 2012 Metaphysics.
– [ Laerke Recht, July 2016]

14.7.5 The substantive nature of the referential dimension

For Kant’s referring to his first Critique as a “critical attempt” see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. B107.
On the potential problems of formalism see Levi- Strauss 1960 Structure And Form.

14.7.6 "Reason"

Chemistry must be considered a “systematic art” rather than a “science” – MA, p. V.

14.7.7 "Dialectics"

The semantic extension proposed here for Kant’s concept of dialectics applies also to the other acceptations of the term.

14.8 Referentiality – the implications

Caws 1997 Structuralism.
See also under the theme Colonialism.

14.8.1 The external referent

“Value” in Lotze (see Mezzanzanica 2006 Dilthey).
Kadare 1980 Palace Of Dreams: external interfering agents.

14.8.2 Interlocking systems

Francis Bacon, Of Proficience and Advancement of Learning Divine and Human 1605, on the partition of sciences.
Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers 1751-72, with the tree by D’Alembert in the first volume.
Linguistic analysis: Saussure 1967 Cours.
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14.10.1 Three stages

-The confrontational legacy: Note the English term “superstructure” is not applicable to a discussion about structure in Marx, not only because the German original (“Überbau”) really refers to the upper level of a building, but also because it has no direct relationship to the central import of the Kantian concept of structure.
Karatani 1977 Transcritique on Kant and Marx, with emphasis on the aspect of mediation (bracketing) between perception and idea, resulting in symbolic mediation.
On Dilthey’s emphasis on structure see especially Rodi 1985 Dilthey Kritik.
On Dilthey’s taking distance from Kant see below, 14.11.
-The subterranean legacy: Cassirer 1921 Einsteinschen.
Saussure 1967 Cours.
Wells 2006 Critical Philosophy.
Peirce 1937 Collected is well aware of Kant. In CP, 1.4 he says that for three years he devoted two hours a day to the study of the Critique of Pure Reason, until he knew it practically by heart. Not that the results were particularly impressive, since he states (1.5) that classical German philosophy does not have much weight in terms of ability to develop an argument. See also CP, 1.1; 8.329 and Murphey M G 1961 Development.
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]
For the description of Lévi-Strauss’es method as “Kantism without transcendentals” see Ricoeur 1963 Symbole Et Temporalite; Lévi-Strauss.
On Kant’s legacy: Cicovacki 2001 Kant Legacy.
– [ Laerke Recht, July 2016]
Commentary and translation of de Saussure: Harris R 1987 Reading Saussure.
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14.10.2 The ultimate impact

“Structured whole”: Dilthey 1883 Einleitung.
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14.11 Para-perception and the transcendental revolution

Dilthey 1883 Einleitung: the quote is from p. LXI: “In den Adern des erkennenden Subjekts, das Locke, Hume und Kant konstruierten, rinnt nicht wirkliches Blut, sondern der verdünnte Saft von Vernunft als bloßer Denktätigkeit.” See also his reference to Kant’s “starren und toten a priori” (cited by Rodi 2003 Strukturierte 2003 Strukturierte, p. 44); “das a priori Kants ist starr und tot; aber die wirklichen Bedingungen des Bewußtseins und seine Voraussetzungen, wie ich sie begreife, sind lebendiger geschichtlicher Prozeß, sind Entwicklung, sie haben ihre Geschichte …” (cited ibid., p. 28); and “Das Leben der Geschichte ergreift auch die scheinbar starren und toten Bedingungen, unter welchen wir denken” (cited ibid., p. 48, emphasis mine in all passages).
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]
See also Cassirer’s aim to transcend Kant’s opposition between “simple” matter and “pure” form, where he stresses the fact that “the world of perception, far from being an amorphous mass of impressions, includes already within itself certain fundamental forms which are primitive embodiments of the synthesis” (Cassirer 1925 Philosophie 3, Teil 3, p. 11, cited in Mezzanzanica 2006 Dilthey, p. 220 f.) This suggests a situation similar to the one I have described as para-perception.
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]
Peirce 1937 Collected (1.5; 5.307) stresses the great importance of the association of ideas in the prescientific age.
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]
Jung C G 1935 Archetypen, p. 29 f. explicitly links the archetype of the soul to the notion of an apriori: “Man kann sie [anima] nicht machen, sondern sie ist immer das Apriori von Stimmungen, Reaktionen, Impulsen und was es sonst an psychischen Spontaneitäten gibt.” On p. 35 f. he speaks of archetypal ground forms that are rooted in (prehistoric) perception rather than thought: “Es genügt zu wissen, daß es nicht eine wesentliche Idee oder Anschauung gibt, die nicht historische Antezedentien besäße. Allen liegen in letzter Linie archetypische Urformen zugrunde, deren Anschaulichkeit in einer Zeit entstanden ist, wo das Bewußtsein noch nicht dachte, sondern wahrnahm.”
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]
Wynn 1989 Evolution.
The introduction of speech, see e.g. Calvin & Bickerton 2001 Lingua Ex Machina; Carstairs- Mc Carthy 1999 Origins Of Complex Language; King 1999 Origins Of Language; Lieberman 2002 Human Language; Wynn & Coolidge 2011 Think Like Neandertal.
– [ Laerke Recht, July 2016]

14.12 A critique of "human" reason

Simmel 1913 Kant: the quote is from p. 6: “Die unnachläßliche Strenge seiner Moral stammt aus seinem logischen Fanatismus, der dem gesamten Leben die Form mathematischer Exaktheit aufdrängen m¨chte.”
– [ Giorgio Buccellati ]
Chomsky 1957 Syntactic; Moro Andrea 2008 Boundaries: sudden genetic change.
Dilthey quotation: Dilthey 1883 Einleitung, LXI.
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Jung’s archetypes: Jung C G 1985 Archetypen, esp. pp. 13-51, 55-66.
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Critique of Archaeological Reason3. Notes